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Security  Sector Reform is now widely recognized as a crucial part  of  
any  conflict  intervention   or  post-conflict   reconstruction project. Where  
security  forces are  unable  or unwilling  to  provide  the  popu- lation with 
basic safety and security,  it is difficult if not impossible for other  elements  
of  societal  development  and  healing  to occur.  While more attention is 
paid now to the  moral  elements  of reform, such as inculcating respect for 
human rights and democratic  governance,  suc- cess in these  elements  of 
reform  has  been  limited.   Notably,  though it has been the  target  of 
several major outside  reform programs,  the military  of the  Democratic  
Republic  of Congo  remains  notorious  for human  rights  abuses.   This  paper  
argues  that the  limited  success of human rights training  as part  of SSR is a 
result not (only) of failures to teach  human  rights  or build  requisite  
systems  of  accountability,  but rather of a fundamental need  to  reconceive 
what  respecting  human rights involves. Reform efforts need to treat human  
rights compliance as the  effect of rebuilt,  mutually respectful,  practical  
social  relation- ships,  not  as external  standards to  which  compliance  is 
secured  by exhortation or incentive.   This  shift  in conceptualization has  
impli- cations  for both  the  structure of reform programs  and  the  way that 
outside reformers should conceive of their own social relationships with 
target militaries. 
 
It is perfectly true  that  they used brute  force and that  it is pos- sible 
for us to do likewise, but by using similar means we can get only the 












Security sector reform (SSR) is a critical element of most post-conflict peace- 
building and many conflict prevention  strategies.  SSR programs aim to take 
security  forces that  are unable  or unwilling to reliably protect  civilian pop- 
ulations  from violence into responsible and effective supports  of state  power 
and human  security. 
Part of SSR is capacity-building  — proverbially, getting security forces to 
“shoot straight.” But SSR also targets  the “unwilling” side of the equation, 
through  training  in topics such as human  rights,  the laws of war, and civil- 
military relations, coupled with an acknowledgment that  accountability needs 
to be enhanced and incentives to corruption reduced (e.g., through developing 
the  military  justice  system and  ensuring regular  pay).   While nearly  every 
SSR program  includes  these  “ethical”  elements,  the  focus tends  to  be  on 
making  sure  security  forces know the  rules and  taking  a stab  at  building 
accountability  for those who break them.  Getting  individuals with the power 
provided  by  the tools of violence to live up to ethical  norms  is not  just  a 
matter of changing their incentives, while leaving their inclinations  to abuse 
in place; nor is it a matter of hoping  that  repeated  exhortations  to virtue 
will convince them  to internalize  norms with which  external  incentives are 
imperfectly  aligned.   Those  with  power will behave morally  towards  those 
without  if they see themselves as part of a mutual  project, not as antagonists 
or even just separate actors yoked by a political system.  Dysfunctional power 
hierarchies are undermined  and mutualistic social relationships  supported  by 
the cultivation  of respect, the recognition that  other people are moral equals 
who can make valid claims and who have meaningful responsibilities.  Respect 
should be emphasized  more in SSR, as I hope to show  through  theoretical  
reflection and discussion of field interviews with individuals involved in SSR. 
A legalistic model of legitimacy  places too much weight  on institutions 
that  may take years to build (especially when, ex hypothesi, the people with 
guns are not playing along) and implies a fairly cynical and perhaps simplistic 
understanding of morality.  Without  a deeper transformation of individuals’ 
values and  self-conception than  training  in human  rights  rules provides,  it 
will be very difficult to rein in security force abuses, because accountability 
structures tend to be too weak in the states  most in need of SSR. Even very 
strong  states  need to rely on some level of internalization of ethical  norms 
to keep their security  forces in check — despite  fairly strong  accountability 










My deeper concern goes to what  we count as “success” in SSR. Security 
forces wield coercion and violence against the population,  and they can do so 
in oppressive ways even without  breaking  the law.1    Even if we assume that 
a careful, professional, rule-bound,  but oppressive security force could main- 
tain control indefinitely, security sector reformers should not be content with 
creating forces that  are well-trained enough to use their violence to dominate 
the  population  in a controlled  way.  The  concept  of respect  captures  what 
“more”  we could want out  of a security  force’s relationship  with  the  popu- 
lation,  and also provides a more sophisticated understanding of the  human 
rights standards SSR tries to impart. 
I have three aims in this essay. Based on public materials  and field inter- 
views with individuals involved in UN peacekeeping and US military training, 
I hope to show that something like a concept of respect is implicit in the best 
of current SSR practice, but that making it an explicit focus would be an im- 
provement.  Second, I will discuss the concept of respect with an eye towards 
showing how it is best understood  as relating  to the nature  of  power rela- 
tionships  between individuals.  And, finally, I will trace  out the implications 
of such a social concept of respect for SSR. 
Two notes  are in order,  the  first on methodology:   My interviews  were 
semi-structured, and while I have made every attempt to interview a broad 
selection of individuals within my target  populations  of UN peacekeepers and 
US military  involved with peace and security operations,  neither  the nature 
nor the number  of interviews I collected  would ground  strong,  statistically 
valid claims.  Instead,  the interview results  I present here should be seen as 
part  of a process of “hypothesis generation.”  Interviews yielded perspectives 
on SSR that  I would have been unlikely to consider from the comfort of my 
armchair,  and revealed details of the experience of individuals that  may not 
have been obvious from published materials.  The justification  for any claims 
I make about  the  nature of morality  in SSR, however, is my theoretical  ar- 
gument  in their  favor, not the authority  of my sources.  Even a study  that  
could support  stronger empirical conclusions than  mine would at best estab- 
lish that  the population  studied  believed certain  claims about  the  morality 
of SSR, not that  the morality  was as they  believed it to be — that  would 
still require philosophical argument. 
 
1 
I discuss  this  at  greater  length,  along  with  different  conceptions  of how we should 










Second, my focus in this paper will be in some ways broader and in some 
ways narrower than  the way “SSR” is sometimes used. On the one hand, the 
term  “Security Sector Reform ” can have derogatory  connotations, implying 
that  the  recipient  forces are  bad  rather  than  under-resourced  or acting  in 
a difficult context,  and  so some actors  engaged in support  to the  security 
sector will refer to their work as “capacity building” or “support”  rather  than 
reform.2   While recognizing this concern, since “SSR” is in common use, I will 
use it to mean any program aimed at enhancing the ability of security sector 
actors  to  fulfill their  duties.   On  the  other,  while SSR encompasses  work 
with  a  wide  variety  of actors  and  institutions, including  military,  police, 
border  patrol,  corrections/penal system,  and  legal system,  I will focus on 
the  military.  Many  of my  reflections  also apply  to  other  security  actors, 
especially police (given the way in which lines between internal  and external 
security  duties  are blurred  in socieities experiencing  violent  civil conflict). 
But I am most confident that  they apply to the primary  area of my thought 
and research, the military.  Finally, while SSR is important in many contexts, I 
will  focus primarily  on the issue of SSR in states  emerging from conflict, 
rather  than transitioning  to democratic  rule or on the brink of failure. 
 
 
Ethics Training in SSR 
 
Current  approaches  to  SSR do  not  ignore  “ethical”  (for  lack of a  better  
word)  elements.   According  to  the  US Military’s  field manual on stability 
operations,  security  sector  reform “aims to provide an effective and  legiti- 
mate  public service that  is  transparent, accountable  to civil authority, and 
responsive to the needs of the public.”3  Similarly, a joint guidance document 
for the  Department  of Defense, Department  of  State, and  US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) states  that  the “objective [of SSR] is to 
design, develop, and deliver foreign assistance such that  it promotes effective, 
legitimate, transparent, and accountable security and development in partner  
states.”4  United Nations documents emphasize even more SSR as a means to 
securing fundamental human goods, in addition to being about making secu- 
rity forces more technically proficient; a 2008 report of the Secretary-General 
 
2 
For example,  I was corrected  on this point by a few individuals  during  my interviews 
at United  States  Africa Command  (AFRICOM) in July  2010. 
3 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Stability Operations,  §6-4, emphasis  mine. 
4 









frames the issue of SSR in terms of the principle that  “men and women have 
the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger 
and the fear of violence, oppression, or injustice.”  The report  goes on to lay 
out  the  elements  of “effective and  accountable”  security  sectors,  putting  a 
“legal and/or constitutional framework for the  legitimate  and  accountable 
use of force” and “mechanisms  for the direction  and oversight of security... 
as well as the protection  of human  rights”  ahead  of the capacity  to provide 
“effective” security (and follows up with the need for a “culture  of service”).5 
Most SSR programs  seem to approach  teaching  human  rights  and other 
ethics-relevant topics the way that  a professor might in a well-run classroom: 
there  is some  element  of in-class instruction  in the  basic principles  of hu- 
man  rights,  especially as  they  appear  in international law,  which is then 
supplemented  by including human rights-relevant elements in field exercises 
and  simulations  (e.g., simulating  an engagement with  insurgent forces near 
a population  of refugees).  This is, for example, the approach that members 
of the  Rwandan  military  who had  taken  US-funded  peacekeeper  training 
courses described to me in interviews  in Gako, Rwanda  (December  2009). 
The interviewees estimated  that  about  an hour  was spent on human  rights 
in a week-long  class.   International militaries  in contact  with  post-conflict 
militaries may also emphasize the instrumental benefits of respecting human 
rights for “winning hearts  and minds.”  For example, in interviews in Goma, 
DRC (November 2009) members of the MONUC mission explained to me that  
they found it very effective to explain to Congolese soldiers how much easier 
it would be to work with Congolese civilians if they built  good will through 
respecting human  rights and engaging in small development projects. 
If the forces to be reformed have histories  of abuse,  this  approach  may 
be inadequate  to  the  impressive task  of changing  their  basic mindset  and 
approach.   If security  forces  are abusive because their  members  are moral 
monsters  (or, more charitably,  desperate) who do not understand that  abus- 
ing vulnerable  populations  is wrong, then  it is quaint to think  that  training 
on international standards by well-heeled representatives  of Western  mili- 
taries will make them see the error of their  ways; they may be convinced by 
the  instrumental arguments,  but  those lessons will quickly be overcome in 
cases where abuse  makes tactical  sense.6     On the other  hand,  if abuses are 
 
5 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  and  United  Nations  Security  Council,  Securing 
Peace and Development,  §§5, 15. 
6 
Which  it  often  will, at  least  in the  short  term  — for a comprehensive  discussion  of 









driven by institutional pressures like lack of pay, it is almost a cruel joke to 
expect security forces to maintain  their integrity just because they have been 
exhorted  to do so. 
But, it is not immediately  clear how to improve the normative  elements 
of SSR. The impulse is to insist on more training,  if only to emphasize the 
importance  of the  issues,  but  this  may not  be appropriate.  One US offi- 
cer involved with managing  US training programs  in Africa, told me he was 
confident  that  the  relatively  brief human  rights  component  of the  training 
programs he oversaw was adequate.  As he explained it, human rights norms 
are fairly straightforward and easy to grasp.  Some issues may need clarifi- 
cation,  such as who counts as a civilian under international law when many 
people not directly involved in the fight indirectly  support  combatants.  But 
overall, spending a lot of time drilling on human rights rules, especially when 
students  will be getting  very similar human  rights instruction  as part  of sev- 
eral different classes, is likely to be pointless or even disrespectful — it may 
imply that  the  students  are too stupid  to be able to learn  and  follow the 
rules.7 
If not more  training,  then  what?   Both instruction  in rules and demon- 
stration  of practical  benefits for compliance with them approach  morality in 
a particular  way, closely  aligned with the way human  rights  are treated  in 
law.  On this  view, there  is morality, which is “given” independently  of the 
individual, and then there is the individual’s identity, goals, and motivational 
set.  The  problem is to connect  the  two — either  by showing the  inherent 
beauty of the moral law, or the benefits to the individual of following it.  This 
image gives rise to classic problems of moral motivation,  as well as questions 
about  whether human rights  norms are truly  universal or culturally  bound. 
I will not  attempt to answer  those  questions  here — the  more immediate 
point is that  training  focused on closing that “gap” has had limited success, 
which indicates  SSR may be trying  to solve a misconstrued problem. 
A different  way of looking at morality  is to take it not to be about  the 
relationship  between an individual  and the  moral law, but  about  the  rela- 
tionship  between one individual  and  another.   On this  view, when someone 
acts immorally, the problem is not a failure to understand the rules, or to see 
where her enlightened self-interest lies; it is a problem with her interpersonal 
 
Violence in Civil War ). 
7 











connections.  Rather  than  modeling morality on the enforcement of law, this 
approach models morality  on cooperation. 
This shift is, I think,  initially plausible — after all, SSR is about  reform- 
ing the relationship  between security forces and those they  are supposed to 
protect.   If human rights are objective standards, it is a good thing  in itself 
if they are supported,  but  the role of human  rights  in SSR is that  respect- 
ing them  demonstrates a security force’s respect  for the moral equality  and 
human  dignity  of their  charges.  Similiarly, though  discussions of “account- 
ability”  are often framed in terms  of creating  institutions to which security 
forces can be held accountable  (e.g., courts)  we should not forget that  the 
ultimate  goal of institutional accountability should be making security forces, 






Underlying the human  rights tradition are ideas about  the way that  human 
beings should relate to each other — one key being respect.  As the preamble 
to the  Universal  Declaration  of Human  Rights  puts  it,  “recognition  of the 
inherent  dignity  and  of the  equal and  inalienable  rights  of all members  of 
the  human  family is the  foundation  of  freedom,  justice  and  peace in the 
world.”8      The idea that  respect  for specific rules of  morality  flows from a 
more fundamental  respect for the dignity of the human  being shows up both 
in very “legalistic” moral approaches,  such as Kant’s one, and in ones more 
explicitly focused on society, such as Hegel’s. But I would like to begin with a 
source closer to home for SSR and perhaps  less expected:  the Forces Armées 
de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC,  the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic  Republic of Congo). 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is transitioning (hopefully) to 
peace after a series of brutal wars that  involved internal divisions and external 
interference — bringing in so many parties  that  it has been called “Africa’s 
World War.”9    Before that  (as Zaire) it  suffered from decades of corruption 
and state weakness. One legacy of that  history is a severely damaged security 
sector.   The  FARDC  has  faced the  further  problem  of rapidly  integrating 
 
8 
United  Nations  General  Assembly (The  Universal  Declaration of Human  Rights ); see 
also Appiah  (The  Honor  Code, pp. 128—130). 
9 









former rebel forces into  its ranks,  and  the  result  has been a military  that  
has been credibly accused of extreme  abuses of the population  and being in 
league with forces that  continue to war (especially in the  eastern  DRC).10 
The FARDC has been the target  of a number of international SSR programs 
(both bilateral and via the UN), including an effort by the United  States  to 
train  a “model” light infantry battalion.11 
A member  of AFRICOM  who works with  the  FARDC  told  me about 
her  experiences  with  a group  of FARDC  officers convened  as part  of the 
project.  When asked what  the main problem was in their  relationship  with 
civilians, the FARDC  replied that  Congolese civilians did not respect them. 
The trainers  and military  then  went on to discuss why it might be that  the 
soldiers were not respected — e.g., the soldiers believed it was civilians’ duty 
to give them  food and shelter,  because they  were not  regularly  paid by the 
government,  and so would simply take what they needed/wanted — and how 
they might approach  civilians so as to elicit greater  respect.12 
At least in the FARDC’s minds, what we outsiders see as military “abuses” 
against civilians were justified in part  by poor moral treatment at the hands 
of the civilian  population.   They  specifically did not  refuse to justify  their 
actions,  or do so in terms  of  something  like the  right  of soldiers to  do as 
they  please, or communal  superiority.   Of  course, that  perspective is likely 
to strike most outsiders  as more than  a little  grotesque, given the FARDC’s 
record of human  rights abuses.  Whatever  “disrespect”  is shown by civilians 
is likely to pale before that. 
At the same time, the anecdote  does seem to speak to something  impor- 
tant about  the relationship  between the  FARDC  — and,  perhaps,  abusive 
security forces in general — and the population.  By appealing to the notion 
of “respect”  the FARDC  highlights  the  relationship  between them  and the 
civilian population.  Like all relationship  concepts, respect cannot  simply be 
reduced  to  the  observance  of certain  rules,  and  it  is ideally  mutual.    The 
 
10 
Mahtani et al., Final Report  of the Group of Experts on the Democratic  Republic of the 
Congo, SS22—55 (support to FDLR),  SS317, 321—323 (use of child soldiers), SS336—344 
(sexual  violence),  SS357—370 (attacks on civilians and  other  war crimes),  §377 (attacks 
on humanitarians); Sawyer  and  Van  Woudenberg, You Will Be Punished,  pp.  85—115, 
See, e.g. 
11 
Mobekk, “Security  Sector Reform”; Onana  and Taylor,  “MONUC and SSR”; Dalrym- 
ple, U.S. and DRC in Partnership ; Security  Sector  Reform  in the Congo ; Thomas-Jensen 
and Gingerich,  No Will. 
12 










FARDC  members put  the cart  before the horse by demanding  respect from 
citizens before they showed citizens respect, but their demand for reciprocity 
reflects some understanding of how the relationship should operate.  In a pure 
case of first encounter  between two moral equals, both  sides could demand 
respect.  The  request  is grotesque  in this  case because the FARDC  and  the 
civilian population  already  have  a relationship,  one that  the  FARDC  has 
profoundly damaged. 
The  very  concept  of “respect”  gets  degraded  when  security  forces are 
abusive.  An understandable, cynical reaction  to this anecdote  would be to 
conclude that  by “respect us,” the FARDC  simply meant “give us what  we 
want.”  And, if you asked the civilians, it is not clear that  they would have had 
a fully-formed concept  of respect,  either.  This is not  an intellectual  failure. 
Where security forces are threats rather  than  protectors,  it is not even clear 
what “respect” between them and civilians could mean.  The standard images 
that  the  term  calls up — calm discussion, mutual  accommodation,  etc.  — 
seem laughably  irrelevant.   These  outward  behaviors  of respect  may seem 
relatively  trivial  compared  to  real abuses,  but  their  significance is in what 
they express.  Incivility in itself is only a minor harm.  But  the fact that  we 
are generally willing to be civil to people who we hold in little esteem shows 
how radically  social relationships  have fallen apart  when extending  civility 
seems futile, or even immoral.   Human  rights  cannot  fully take hold where 
the  social  relations  that  make me regard  you as human  in the  first place 
have collapsed.  SSR programs  that  try  to address  egregious abuses without 
addressing  this social breakdown are incomplete. 
To make good on that  claim,  let me begin by trying  to illuminate  the 
concept of “respect,”  which can be used in vague and incohate  ways. 
One concept  of respect  for persons (basically  Kant’s)  is that  respect  is a 
matter of recognizing people as moral  equals.  This  is not  in the  sense of 
being equally good, but rather  in the sense that  we all share the capacity  to 
act for reasons and hence both  make  reasonable  claims on others,  and can 
be held accountable  for our actions.13 . Part  of the value of humanity  that  is 
to be respected,  on this sort of account,  is that  the  “ultimate-ness” of our 
reason-giving is important;  we are creatures  who generate value in the world 
by valuing things,  and so the respect we are due is unconditional.   We can 
 
13 
The  kind  of respect  I have in mind  is associated  with  Kant’s  argument  that people 
are “ends in themselves,”  as he argues at (Grounding  for the Metaphysics  of Morals, p. 36 










compare people with respect to various standards of value, but our ability to 
value things stands  behind all those standards. We are “equal” because it is 
nonsensical to try to find some standard of value more ultimate  than  human 
practices  of valuing by which we could be compared.14 
A different approach  to respect is Hegel’s, exemplified in his dialectic  of 
“lordship  and bondage”  or “the  master  and the slave.”15   While the concept 
Hegel is concerned with here is generally translated as “recognition,”  the core 
of the  concept  is similar to the Kantian one in many ways.16     Hegel is con- 
cerned overall to explain how true  consciousness emerges, in particular the 
ability to be a creature  that  can understand and act for reasons.  An impor- 
tant part  of that  story is how we get beyond a narcissistic consciousness that  
recognizes only its own needs, to understand that  others  also have  reasons 
and make claims on us (and, hence, to convert our mere desires/impules into 
reasons  that  are part  of this  practice  of claim and counter-claim).   On the 
Hegelian account,  respect  is not  an attitude that  pure reason brings us to 
take toward others,  it is the outcome of social struggle. 
The master/slave story begins Hegel’s argument that  reasoning must  be 
a social  project.17    The problem for an isolated  individual  is that  she faces 
only brute  objects, which cannot  affirm the correctness of her actions.  This 
problem is tied to the inherent public-ness of reasons — to know that some 
desire I have is backed by a reason I need to  see that  other  reason-taking  
creatures  also are willing to act  on it.  Otherwise  it might just be desire in 
fancy clothes.  But  an object  can’t do this  — I can destroy  it, or use it,  or 
eat it, but  I cannot  make it recognize that  it was a good idea for me to eat 
it.  My lunch faces me in mute  defiance of any demands  that it submit.   In 
Hegel’s words, “[o]n account of the independence of the object...  it [the self- 
 
14 
For a technical discussion of the ultimate-ness of humans  as values/ends, see, e.g., Raz 
(Value,  Respect,  and  Attachment, pp.  140—158). For  (a  small  sample  of ) contemporary 
writings that use and build upon (often in wildly varying directions)  this notion of respect, 
see Raz (Value,  Respect,  and Attachment, ch. 4); Thomas  E. Hill (Respect,  Pluralism, and 
Justice,  64ff); Korsgaard   (Creating the  Kingdom  of Ends,  esp.  pp.  17—18 and  ch.  4); 
Scanlon (What  We Owe to Each  Other,  though  he distances  his account from Kant,  pp. 
5—6); Darwall (“Two Kinds of Respect”,  p. 45, a form of his “recognition  respect”) 
15 
Hegel, pp. 111—119, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, pp. 170—176 (§§430-435). 
16 
The  fact that it is natural to talk  about  respect  in terms  of “recognizing”  someone’s 
moral  equality  and  recognizing  someone’s standing in terms  of “respecting”  their  rights 
and privileges is no accident. 
17 
My argument  in this  section  cribs  shamelessly  from  the  excellent  reconstruction of 









conscious agent] can achieve satisfaction  only when the object  itself effects 
the  negation  [i.e., the  transformation into something  that  conforms to the 
agent’s desires] within itself.”  What  I need, if I am to recognize myself as a 
reasoner,  and  hence as a free agent worthy of respect,  is someone else who 
is a reasoner and yet will submit  to my reasons. 
The first thing  that  happens  when one solitary  conscious agent  finally 
meets another is that  they fight.  Each tries to prove his total  independence 
by declaring himself to have no fear of death  (which affects that  mere object 
the body),  and to “negate”  the other  by killing him.18    A fight to the death 
is futile,  but  if one combatant  submits  out  of fear of  death,  a proto-social 
relationship  is born.   The one who submitted becomes the slave, and  must 
now vet what he believes to be good reasons for action against  the master’s. 
This is  an  essential move in coming to have recognizable public reasons — 
the “public”  is only two people, but  the move of saying, “this  is my reason, 
but  is it one that  others  would  accept?”   is the  fundamental  move toward 
full-blooded reasoning and, ultimately,  the ability to respect others. 
The ironic twist  in Hegel’s story  is that  the slave ends up with a more 
developed consciousness than  the master.  The master,  because he never has 
to check his reasons against anyone else’s, is left in a sort of childlike delusion. 
To the  extent  that  he believes  that  the  slave does as he asks because his 
reasons are good ones, he is deeply mistaken — the slave does as he is told 
not because of any normative force, but simply because the master can put a 
gun to his head.19  If the master realizes this, he will also realize that he did not 
get what he wanted — he has the creature  comforts of a loyal slave, but  not 
recognition, since the  slave has turned  out  to be “something  quite  different 
from  an  independent  consciousness.”20    So long as  the  power  relationship 
persists, literally nothing the slave could do could count as recognition, taking 
the master’s reasons seriously as reasons that  can be good or bad — so long 
as you have a gun to someone’s head, there  is no amount of times they  can 
say you are right that  will convince a self-aware agent.   One  need not be a 
philosopher to realize this.  As former soldier with the Zimbabwean military 
reflected on his service in the DRC during the civil war, “there  was nothing 
this [Congolese] woman [who was having sex with some of the soldiers] could 
do; she thought  that we have money, food.  Besides that,  there  is the fact 
 
18 
I generally strive to use gender-neutral language, but the behavior of “consciousnesses” 
in the master-slave  confrontation is so swaggeringly masculine  that I diverge from it here. 
19 
Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology,  p. 60. 
20 









that  we are carrying the gun.  You know, when you have a gun, you wonder, 
Is she cooperating  because she wants to or is she cooperating  because she is a 
slave to you? ”21 
On the other hand,  the slave does begin to develop something like a true 
consciousness  of reasons;  once he realizes that  the  only reason to conform 
his reasons  to  the  master’s  is  that  gun  to  the  head,  he retains  the  basic 
framework of being able to compare  his  reasons to an objective standard, 
but  realizes that  the  master’s  desires are not  that  standard — he can go 
looking for freedom and reason with new tools. 
The Hegelian framework is helpful for understanding what  is going on 
with security  relationships  in need of reform because it builds in social re- 
lationships  and  power  asymmetry.   The  FARDC,  in the  DR Congo, are in 
something like the position of master  to the civilians’ slaves.  The FARDC 
may genuinely feel disrespected,  as if they are treated  more like dangerous 
animals than  human beings. Civilians may have no interest  in granting them 
human  recognition.   As the person who recounted  the story put  it, “you’re 
threatening me with  a gun;  of course  I don’t  like you.”   But  the  problem 
goes deeper  than not  liking someone.   Even if civilians wanted  to  respect 
the  FARDC,  what  could  they  do?   So long as civilians are being coerced, 
there  is very little  they can do that  will  count  as “recognizing” coercers in 
the  way that  Hegel thinks  — plausibly  —  self-conscious creatures  desire. 
Even if civilians are willing to contemplate  the possibility that  the military 
is making a valid claim, the military  can never be sure that  is the reason for 
compliance.  Even the civilians may not really know why they are complying 
— our mental lives are never truly transparent, especially when we are angry 
or afraid. 
Conversely, the  sneaking suspicion that  FARDC  do not  distinguish  be- 
tween  “disrespect”   and  not  getting  what  they  want  is  predicted   by  the 
Hegelian picture.   For  the  master,  there  is no possibility  of subjecting  his 
reasons to a standard that  could  show it lacking.  So what  could refusal to 
comply be, if not  a failure to take those  reasons  seriously, in other  words 
disrespect?  Just  as the  slave may  be unable  to  distinguish  meaningfully 
between agreement and  acquiescence, the  master  will have difficulty distin- 
guishing resistance or mistake from withholding of recognition.22    The power 
relationship  prevents either side from distinguishing  respect/disrespect  from 
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compliance/noncompliance because they  do not share a committment to a 
common standard, but  are just engaged in a battle  of wills. 
The deeper point is that  respect,  on this account,  is about  relationships  
and  not  attitudes.   Respect  is, in particular, not  just  a matter of having a 
particular feeling  toward  or belief about  the  other  person.   Feelings and 
beliefs can constitute respect  only when they  can support  the  right kind of 
social relationship.   The  problem with demanding that  civilians respect  the 
FARDC  is not that  they are asking civilians to do something that would be 
good, if unreasonable  to demand  in their  circumstances.   The perversity  is 
that  they are punishing civilians for failing to do the impossible. So long as 
someone is in a position of severe power advantage,  it is not just  difficult to 





We should take some care in applying lessons from Hegel’s story to the real 
world.  First, Hegel is concerned to tell a “just-so”  story of how “true”  con- 
sciousness emerges, and so his version of the  story  has a happy  ending; the 
master  realizes that  he can only acheive  true  freedom if he does what  the 
slave is doing,  and  so begins to  conform his demands  to  the  slave’s point 
of view and they begin to fumble towards  a truly  joint structure of reasons 
together.23   Ultimately,  power relationships  largely drop out of his story, at 
least in a straightforward sense.  In SSR, we may be concerned with  power 
relations  that  remain dsyfunctional.   Second, Hegel is concerned to tell an 
abstract story and so trucks in absolutes — the master is all desire, the slave 
all obedience, etc.  Realistically,  things  are  more complicated  than  that  — 
no one is ever in full control, or a purely passive victim. 
While I brushed  aside the Kantian  tradition rather  quickly above, it has 
resources that may help us understand in more detail  how the master/slave 
opposition  can be  overcome.  In addition  to his clearly respect-focused  
formula  of “humanity,” Kant also  claims that  the supreme  moral imperative 
can be understood  in a pseudo-social way. “A rational  being must always re- 
gard himself as a legislator in a kingdom of ends,” where a “kingdom of ends” 
is a community  of beings who all simultaneously  create  laws and  subject 
themselves to them,  laws that  respect their  mutual  equality  and freedom.24 
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In Kant’s account,  this community  is used hypothetically, but  Kantians  like 
Christine Korsgaard have used the basic insight to uncover the ways in which 
respect is tied to actual  community. 
Hegel moves from the master-slave  dialectic to the consideration  of free- 
dom as independence  of thought and  the  search for objective rational  stan- 
dards  of knowing, largely leaving behind questions  of how respect manifests 
practically.25     Korsgaard  starts  from the  Kantian  insight  that, if respect  is 
about treating  others as people who can act on reasons, it is a double-edged 
sword.  If I respect you, it means that  I will take  seriously your reasons as 
reasons that  also apply to me - for instance,  if you want something, because 
you see it as good for you, I will take that  to be a significant reason in favor of 
my helping you get it, or at least not interfering with you. But it also means 
that  I  will hold you responsible for your actions  when the reasons you act 
for are not good ones.  Treating  someone who has done wrong as though  she 
completely  lacked responsibility for her actions  is to treat  her as something 
like a mere animal, and a sign of disrespect. 
Responding to someone’s (claimed) reasons involves action.  If the core of 
respect is  forming reciprocal relationships  with others  and acting  together, 
then  what  you should  do  is simply  whatever  that  joint  project  demands. 
The most obvious case is punishment for wrongdoing, but Korsgaard (rightly) 
makes the central practical attitude involved in holding someone to be respon- 
sible, respecting them,  to be w i l l i ng  “to take a chance on  reciprocity.” In 
the  abstract, this  involves a willingness to  “act  together.”26   Korsgaard 
leaves this notion of acting together  relatively abstract. In part,  this is prob- 
ably because she is more concerned with how it relates to Kant’s concept of 
freedom than  to the worries about  power dynamics that  I am drawing from 
Hegel.  But  in part,  there  is little  more to be said in general about  what  it 
means. 
Social practices both “fill in” this notion of respect and provide the point 
of leverage for outside intervention.  In the real world, we cannot just assume 
that  the  master  will “wake up,”  or that  security  forces will see the  error of 
their  ways.  A focus on punishment and accountability is both  theoretically 
and practically  tempting  - we have concrete institutions of punishment that  
help specify what  we should do when someone offends against  respect, and 
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in the SSR context we are already focused on what is going wrong. But what 
respect and social practices/joint projects demand when respect is not being 
violated  is just  all the  other  formal and informal practices  and institutions 
of society.   An outsider  looking to  build  respect  should  focus as much  on 
creating  and  fostering the  positive practices  that  bring security  forces and 
civilians together  as on the institutions of accountability that come into play 
when they are antagonists. 
The problem with the power imbalance when those who wield violence do 
not make themselves responsible to the claims of civilians is objective, rather  
than  subjective.  Remember that  part  of the problem for the master  and the 
slave was that  the  power relationship  undermined  the  ability  to distinguish 
between capitulation and acceptance  of reasons.  Even if one party committs 
to not using its power, the problem remains — if the only assurance you have 
that  I will not use the gun to your head is my unenforceable promise that  I 
will not use it, your actions will still be constrained  by fear.27 
That  said, the problem is not really about  equalizing power, but  about 
creating  joint  projects that  change its context.   It  is one thing  for you to 
promise (unenforceably)  not  to  use your power to get something  that  you 
want  and  could get with it.   It  is another  for  both  of us to be engaged in a 
joint  project  in the  context  of which what  you want  simply  cannot  be 
achieved by raw power. For example, if I am interested  in the respect of my 
professional colleagues, I may outmatch  them  in physical strength, but that  
power is not very useful — exercising it against  them  would be brutal  and 
counterproductive.  I may be able to get them  to say they  respect  me, but 
that  is not the same as actually getting  their respect.  This is one core lesson 
of the  Hegelian dialectic;  the  goods that  can  be acquired  by violence are 
relatively limited  in scope.  Of course, you may doubt  my  committment  to a 
joint project as much as you doubt  the sincerity of my promise, if you are 
weaker than  I am, but  being deeply involved in a joint project also provides 
more “points of contact”  for reciprocity that  can help reinforce both the joint 
committment and evidence thereof.  A security force that  does not have the 
respect  of its civilian population can control  but  not  govern.  This problem 
goes both ways; civilians who do not have a respectful relationship  with their 
security forces can be free of them  (at  best)  but  not protected.28 
Thinking of the ethics/human rights component of SSR outside the frame- 
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work of formal accountability opens up the field for deeper thinking  about 
how to build a responsive security sector, in ways that  link up with other cri- 
tiques of the SSR approach.  SSR is generally state-centric;  the basic model 
is that  there is a state,  and what is needed is to secure that  state’s monopoly 
on force while also helping it to use force more effectively and appropriately. 
But  this assumes a lot in a post-conflict situation.  All the talk of “account- 
ability” in the SSR definitions cited above assumes that  there is a meaningful 
state and something  like a civil society that  can be helped to exercise over- 
sight over it — but this  is not  a generally warranted  assumption.   In many 
post-conflict areas, individuals face a set of overlapping and disunified power 
groups and  elites,  and  exercise both  “voice”  within  them  and  “exit”  from 
them on a fluid basis. Civilians in such societies may not look to the state  as 
the provider of security and hence as the locus of their demands  for security 
to be provided  in a better  way.  Increasing  state  security  capacity  in such a 
situation  may  mean giving better  tools of violence to an institution that  
everyone sees as just  one  parochial  power group among others.   Increasing 
compliance with general good-governance principles  may seem irrelevant or 
even nonsensical in a situation  where there is limited “demand”  for stronger 
state  structures in a Western mold from civilians who are used to  working in 
a particularistic political  landscape.29    In my terms,  it is meaningless to try  
to  reform the  nature  of the  joint  military-civilian  project  if people do not 
think  of  themselves  in terms  we would recognize as “military,”  as part of 
“civil society,” or as engaged in a “joint project”  in the first place.  That  
sense of joint endeavour  must  be built.  And building it may be much more 
a matter of knitting  together  many smaller  existing security  arrangements 
into a meaningful whole than  starting  from the assumption that  either there 
is no security  sector  and  it  must  be built,  or there  is one  and  it  roughly 
corresponds to what would be the state’s public provision of security services 
in a stable  democratic  system.30 
SSR practitioners should  keep in mind  that  the  problems  of the  secu- 
rity sector are likely to be rooted  in deeper pre-conflict social problems.  A 
simplistic contrast  between “good” civilians and  “bad”  security  forces may 
conceal the fact that  security forces justify abuses to themselves in part  be- 
cause of real or perceived abuses of non-military  power  by  groups that  are 
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now vulnerable  civilians; for instance,  Séverine Autesserre’s  research  in the 
DRC found that some of the civilians in the most dire straits  were members 
of the former communal leadership, who were abused by security forces made 
up largely of members of groups who had felt marginalized  and abused  un- 
der their  rule before the war.31   Unfortunately, this means that  building the 
joint projects from which mutual  respect  flows may require work on a host 
of underlying social conflicts that  may be difficult to resolve and beyond the 
bounds of what interventions  — especially security-focused ones — consider 
interveners’ job.32 
Finally,  it points  to something  about  the  position  of the  FARDC  in the 
broader  social world that  deserves more discussion — the  fact that,  if the 
ability to show respect is conditioned on being free from certain kinds of bad 
social relationships,  then  there  may be  pressures  on the  FARDC,  or other 
military groups, besides their inherent indiscipline or evil that  help to explain 
the difficulty of SSR. 
 
 
Chains of Respect 
 
Though security forces are locally “the powerful,” they may be globally “the 
weak.”   Members of post-conflict  security  forces are themselves  subject  to 
an  array  of social and  psychological  pressures.  For  instance,  one trainer  
told me that,  in her judgment,  everyone in the FARDC  suffered from post- 
traumatic  stress  disorder.33      Conversely,  I have been told  by practitioners  
that,   in their  opinion,  good  security  institutions are  the  result  of a good 
political environment  — e.g., that  the  Senegalese police were highly valued 
participants i n  peacekeeping missions because of the lack of coups in Senegal 
and hence political independence of the police.34   This is in addition  to the 
ways  in which mastery  itself can undermine  one’s ability to grant others 
respect. 
Power  relations  that  oppress you also stand  in the  way of reforming re- 
lationships  with  those  you oppress.  It easy  to  look at  countires  like the 
DRC and see a fairly black-and-white picture  of brutal  abusers and helpless 
victims.  But,  it distorts  our picture  of how to deal with abusers.35 
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As Martha  Nussbaum points out, it can be difficult to reconcile someone’s 
moral agency with the idea that  they are subject to forces beyond their con- 
trol.36   In a way, this is the problem that  leads to the Hegelian master/slave 
confrontation  — feeling that  there is anything outside our control can under- 
mine our sense that  we are free and in control  of our own lives at  all.  But, 
in fact, honest  reflection will show that  we are all subject to external  forces 
to some extent,  yet retain  our agency.  In fact, as the  slave realizes, it is in 
our reaction to things beyond our control that  we often find our freedom and 
agency most  meaningful.37      In a pinch,  most  of us are willing to recognize 
that  people subject to  unfortunate circumstances  still retain  moral agency, 
and are worthy of respect. 
Being understanding of the pressures on others is fairly easy when we see 
people responding to external  forces with dignity and good character,  but  it 
is harder when external forces impact on character  itself.38  It is easy to think 
that  even those who are worst off can still develop good character  and face 
misfortune  with strong  morality  — in  fact, there  are cultural  tropes of the 
poor being more  virtuous  than  the  rich.   Unfortunately,  this  is not  always 
the case in reality — being born in poor circumstances can have an adverse 
effect on character.  It can be tricky to take proper moral notice of this fact. 
On the one hand,  it can cast an offensive pall of disrespect over not only the 
person with poor character  but  over everyone similiarly situated  to say that  
she is not  fully  responsible for her poor character.    On the  other  hand,  it 
would seem like a cruel joke for me, a fairly affluent member of the dominant 
local socio-ethnic group, to tell someone less well-off that  I understand their 
deprivation  but  they should not become embittered  or hostile over it.  I may 
hold that  bad circumstances  should not be used to justify immoral behavior 
toward  others,  but  honest  self-reflection will reveal that  many of us do so 
(though,  for most readers,  neither  the behavior we excuse nor the pressures 
on us are  likely  to  be as extreme  as those  for members  of security  forces 
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Those on the receiving end of inequitable power relationships  are not only 
unable to properly respect those who pressure them,  they are likely to visit 
disrespect  on those  weaker than  they  are.  This is both  an understandable 
psychological response and  a  problem with  social structures.  If I am con- 
strained  by my slavery, even if I have come to realize that  my master’s power 
is not reasonable,  it will be more difficult for me to practically  reform social 
relationships,  including those with people who are my “slaves.” 
This is just  a theoretical  way of putting  a well-attested  practical  point. 
Soldiers may be unpaid or poorly paid, and be in resource conflict with civil- 
ians — the infamous practice of asking soldiers to “live off the land.”  They 
may be indoctrinated into a very rigid hierarchy,  where those at  the  top of 
the hierarchy do not encourage respectful behavior toward subordinates,  and 
may in fact demean it.39    The military  may be subject to external  pressures 
that  undercut  its ability  to  create  a functional  relationship  with  civilians, 
whether  from a domestic government with untoward  ends or from interna- 
tional actors.  Individual  soldiers may lack skills beyond using their weapons 
to impose their will — we should not forget that  being a member of a modern, 
functional military requires more than the ability to shoot straight,  especially 
for militaries that  may have domestic security, “human security,” counterin- 
surgency, or counterterrorism mandates.   Imagine, for instance, the position 
of a Hegelian master who recognizes his untenable moral/epistemological po- 
sition, but  knows no other  way of accomplishing his goals than wielding the 
whip hand  against his slave. 
The basic point is that respecting others is an ability, not just  a state  of 
mind,  and  one that  depends in part  of some degree of “self-respect.”   Re- 
spect  is a capacity  to see  oneself as subject  to and  able to act  sensitively 
on reasons, not dominated  by outside forces. It has a social structure like a 
chain — each person’s ability  to respect  the  next  is in part  conditioned  on 
their  being respected  by those with greater  power.  Of course, part of Nuss- 
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baum’s point is that  this domination  and conditionality  is never the absolute 
mastery  of Hegel’s dialectic.  People find ways of evading power, of making 
space for their  own  self-respect and  respecting others,  even in the  face of 
problematic  social relationships  — otherwise, we would be stuck either with 
Hegels deus ex machina  of the master realizing his empty existence or social 




Respect and SSR 
 
If we take seriously the idea that  SSR is at least as much about  reforming 
the civilian-military  relationship  as it is about  building military  skills, these 
reflections have important implications. 
It supports the view that  more classroom training on human rights norms 
misses the  point.   If human  rights,  or moral issues more generally, are not 
handled  effectively in  SSR,  additional  harping  on the  rules will not  be an 
improvement.  We should re-think what we are doing when we teach people 
human  rights. 
Abuses are committed  by people who understand them well enough, but 
committ  them  nonetheless.   They  may even “understand” the  abusiveness 
of their  action  in  a  way  that   goes beyond  the  formal  recognition  that   it 
violates a commonly accepted  moral or  legal rule.  One trainer  told me of 
sitting  with  FARDC  soldiers who had  committed  rapes  and  holding them 
while they  cried.40    More instruction on international humanitarian law will 
help neither  the soldier who feels pressured into abuses that  traumatize him 
along with the victim, nor the soldier who has defined his victims out of the 
realm of human  respect. 
Instead,  we should  take  seriously the  Kantian  idea  that  respect,  even 
though  it  may seem like a thin  philosopher’s notion,  is in fact the  core of 
morality.  Taking the Korsgaardian  view that  respect is a function of recipro- 
cal social relations  and joint projects, what soldiers need to come to respect 
human rights may be primarily the support and skills to engage productively 
with civilians.  SSR practitioners have what  may be a limited,  but is surely 
an important role here. There are “classroom” activities  that  can contribute 
to joint projects — some civil-military skills can be learned, but conflict reso- 
lution and negotiation  skills, e.g., should be seen as part  of the human rights 
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project,  not as an optional  add-on  primarily  useful for specialized missions, 
like peacekeeping. 
Second, SSR programs  are — or should be — part  of a larger approach 
to post-conflict peacebuilding  or conflict prevention  (as appropriate). Unity 
of effort is easier  to  talk  about  than  to  implement,  but  if SSR is isolated 
from other  elements,  its  moral  aspect  is very  likely to  suffer. How well- 
trained  a military is, in the narrow sense, may actually help with its tendency 
and ability  to respect  civilians — I have been downplaying psychology, but 
militaries  the  world over  have made  discipline  and  professionalism  a core 
element of their  strategy  for instilling the kind of pride in a social role that  
keeps soldiers from abusing their  power, and I see no  reason to think  they 
are  wrong about  its  effects.   But  a well-trained  military  that  is part  of a 
society in which the government does not work on behalf of the people will 
find that the societal role they have been exhorted  to fill does not exist.  SSR 
needs to be part  of an  intervention  that helps civilians and  military  build 
the  joint  project  — whether  a  mega-joint-project   called  a  “nation-state” 
or smaller ones — that  mutual  respect  requires  as its social basis.  People 
committed  to  joint  projects  will refrain  from abusing  each  other  because 
the  project  itself becomes important to  them,  and  hence the people in it 
become important to them, too. Refraining from abuse goes from having the 
character  of an externally  imposed constraint to a natural consequence of a 
social relationship. 
This recommendation  is consonant  with the focus on “local ownership” 
in SSR, but shows a different, overlapping,  aspect  of the  problem.41   “Local 
ownership”  concerns are  generally driven by the (very real) need to assure 
that  security  structures put  in place are  culturally  appropriate, reflect the 
real security needs of the population,  are sensitive to the particular political 
dynamics in place, and are sustainable  because embraced by the people who 
will be using them,  not just by outsiders. 
The “joint project”  perspective may mean  we need to expand  our un- 
derstanding  of “local ownership,”  though.  For one thing,  “local ownership” 
is sometimes seen as being in  tension with the creation  of professional and 
legitimate  security  forces — part  of the  tension  between “getting  it right” 
and handing over sovereignty so as not to go beyond the legitimate bounds of 
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involvement.42   The conceptual tension arises if we think of the security sector 
(and  governance  in general)  as something  to be “built”  and  then  “handed 
over.”   Practically,  this  conceptualization is reinforced by SSR approaches 
that  conceive of legitimacy largely in terms of accountability.43   I recommend 
instead seeing accountability as one outgrowth of joint and reciprocal involve- 
ment  in providing for human security.  To the extent that external actors can 
help foster this,  there  may still be a question  of when to “step  back,”  but 
reforming  the  security  sector  appears  to be part  of the  process of building  
a sovereign community,  rather  than  a task  that  must  be completed  before 
sovereignty can be granted. 
In addition,  SSR practitioners should seek to foster self-respect in soldiers 
that  goes beyond instilling a sense of “professionalism” in a rule-like manner. 
Self-respect is not just about feeling that  one is able to conform to an admired 
external standard. Even Kant,  while he emphasizes the transcendence of the 
moral  law,  insists  that  the  characteristic of human  beings that  makes us 
worthy  of respect  is that  we give ourselves the  moral  law.   Self-respect is 
recognizing the same thing in oneself that  my potted  Kant and Hegel ask us 
to recognize in others — that  we are actors-on-reasons and originators of valid 
moral claims.  This requires not  just  that  SSR bring soldiers to understand 
best practices  and rules, but that  it foster their  moral autonomy. 
Given a chance, soldiers in even very damaged  militaries will often show 
themselves  capable  of serious moral reflection, and will respond to the op- 
portunity for it.   The  same  member  of AFRICOM  personnel  who worked 
with the  FARDC  soldiers who committed  rapes told  me about  a sexual vi- 
olence curriculum  being developed for the  US’s FARDC  SSR project,  that  
has emphasized  getting  soldiers to talk  to each other  about  what  it means 
to be a man in their society, the pressures they feel to act in ways they often 
acknowledge are wrong, and what elder soldiers wish they could tell younger 
men who have grown up in the context of the civil war, an approach in which 
many students enthusiastically  participated.44 
Another  told  me of a training  program  in which he had  participated, 
focused on civil-military relations.  During one lecture — the subject of which, 
as the interview partner put  it, was “coups are bad”  — several Mauritanian 
officers in the audience challenged the  instructor.  Mauritania had recently 
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had a coup, and the officers argued that,  where civilian leadership had become 
very corrupt,  the  military  was not  only permitted  but  obligated  to step  in. 
My interview partner’s opinion was that  the conversation  that  ensued — in 
which the instructor tried to engage with the objection — was exactly what a 
training  program should do (“that is what getting it right looks like”), based 
on his experience with  members of African militaries  and  judgment  about 
what they wanted and needed out of training,  and that  the only failing of the 
instructor was that  his contractual obligation to present a specific viewpoint 
prevented him from genuinely entertaining the Mauritanians’  arguments.45 
The United States has also been running a program for non-commissioned 
officers  (NCOs)  and  warrant  officers, aimed at  increasing their  profession- 
alism.46    A key  member of the  warrant officer/NCO  program  was quick to 
characterize  the value of the  program  as increasing the self-respect of war- 
rant officers and  NCOs,  as well as the  respect  that  their  superior  officers 
had for them  (his emphasis on the importance  of respect was unprompted). 
He also made much of the importance  of “professional military  education”  
(PME)  — programs  that  focus on providing members of the military  with 
broad educational  opportunities more similar to university  classes than  mil- 
itary  training — for warrant officers/NCOs.  His reasoning was that  warrant 
officers/NCOs in developing militaries, more than anything,  needed the criti- 
cal thinking  skills and flexbility that  such courses provided — teaching them 
“how to think,”  in his words, rather  than  the “what  to think”  of traditional 
training.47   The ability to reason creatively and flexibly is the cognitive basis 
of respect, and what  we hope to be respected for, as rational  beings. 
Given what  I’ve said  about  the  nature  of respect  above,  however,  we 
should keep in mind that  SSR is not  just  about  training  provided,  however 
nuanced.  The conditions of respect have to do with social relationships,  and 
so the relationship  between the outside SSR intervener and the subjects will 
be important. This has both  a micro-scale and a macro-scale aspect. 
On the micro-scale, SSR practitioners should model respect to their part- 
ners.   One  contractor who had  been involved with  training  officers from a 
number of Francophone African countries talked at length about  the impor- 
tance,  in his mind,  of informal  conversations  that  took place  outside  the 
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training  sessions. One of the few US personnel who spoke French (the  other 
trainers  worked through  interpreters), he was also the  only one who spent 
time socializing with the African officers. As he described it, while they par- 
ticipated  in joint  activities  as part  of  the  program,  when it came time for 
meals, or breaks,  etc.,  the US personnel and African personnel would go to 
their  own sides of the room. His being willing and able to socialize with the 
Africans had two benefits for him. First,  he was brought into their confidence 
and told about  elements of the program  they disliked and undermined  their 
committment to it, such as feeling that  they were not given enough time for 
breaks and for the Muslims to  pray, that  they declined to raise with other 
trainers.   Second, he was able to  build  friendships  with  them  to  a degree 
beyond that  other trainers  were able to.48    What may seem like trivial slights 
betray  indifference to participants as human  beings, and may send the mes- 
sage that  powerful outside  trainers  need not  concern themselves with the 
human needs of their trainees.  This behavior carries with it broader and 
damaging implicit lessons about relationships  between the powerful and the 
weak. 
The anecdotal evidence I have gathered  of how well these issues are recog- 
nized by US personnel (the  SSR “provider”  with whom I have had the most 
contact)  is mixed.   Some  interviewees were quite  agitated  over the  lack of 
respect they felt most US personnel showed African personnel.  In their view, 
most US trainers  just  wanted  to put  in their  required  hours of instruction 
and go home, had  a contemptuous attitude towards  African militaries,  and 
some even went  so far as to insult  African soldiers while the targets  of the 
abuse  were clearly within  earshot.49     Other  interviewees  reported  that,  by 
and large,  the  need for mutual  respect was well-understood  by US person- 
nel, particularly those involved with civil-military projects and training,  and 
that  any difficulties likely arose from a need to understand the cultural  speci- 
ficities of how respect was expressed.50    Whether these lessons are currently 
well-understood  or not,  if my argument  is correct,  building  social bonds of 
respect between SSR practitioners and their partners, not just improving the 
quality  of the education,  should be seen as a core task. 
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In addition  to the main point that  the skills of respect must  be fostered 
and  modeled  as  a  core  part  of the  human  rights  project,  making  respect 
central  has two other implications  for SSR. 
First,  the joint project concept of respect shows that  there is a danger of 
SSR programs becoming self-undermining.  Above, I argued  that  we should 
reconceptualize the idea that  there is a tension between reform and handing 
over sovereignty — they  are part of the same process.  But  the tension  just 
re-arises in a different form. SSR programs are generally part  of external  in- 
terventions that  include significant material support for national institutions, 
including the security sector. This can make security forces more accountable 
to outside donors than  to locals. Part of creating  a joint project is “working 
out” the divergences in interests  and views between members of the security 
forces and others  in the society, both  civilian elites and the rest of the pub- 
lic.51   External actors can have a role to play in this process — e.g., providing 
conflict resolution training,  creating opportunities for dialogue, and ensuring 
a fair hearing for groups that  do not possess the power of violence. But SSR 
programs  need to be careful not only to build a reciprocal relationship  with 
local security forces, but  to ensure that  their  relationship  does not  replace 
the  one between  security  forces and  the  rest  of the  population.   This  is a 
tricky  balance,  for which very little  general advice can be given.   But  the 
danger  is greatest  if  accountability is thought  of as something  that  can be 
institutionally created  by external  actors  and  then  “handed  over” to local 
civilians, especially if the relationship  between  civilians and security forces 
is conceived of as inherently  an antagonistic  one, where the power of armed 
actors is checked by giving the power to oversee and punish to local civilians, 
who are likely to have less power to do so than  external  actors. 
Secondly, respect  often requires moral engagement,  not  disengagement. 
In some conversations  the issue of respect for others was identified with rela- 
tivism.  For instance, one interviewee, who worked with AFRICOM  on issues 
of cultural  understanding, told me  that  she was an “extreme  cultural  rela- 
tivist.”52   In the course of the interview, it emerged that  she did not mean to 
reject any notion of moral truth, but  nonetheless that  she felt it was impor- 
tant to refrain from judging the views of people from other cultures.  Another 
interviewee told a telling story from his experiences in Sudan.53    He had been 
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assigned a translator who was very focused on emigrating  to the US — and 
did not care if he had to leave his wife and children behind, or what their fate 
would be.  After several conversations  on the  subject,  my interview partner  
“snapped”  and told the translator that he considered him a “scumbag.”  My 
interview partner  was categorical  that  expressing his  views was the  wrong 
thing to do, first because “scumbag” was a culturally-specific judgment, and 
second because it violated  his obligations as an anthropologist  — for an an- 
thropologist,  he told me, people from other  cultures  should be like “ants:” 
“if ants eat their babies, you don’t get angry, that’s  interesting.” 
This “anthropological” perspective is antithetical to true respect.  Respect 
is not only consistent with telling people that  they are morally wrong, it often 
requires it.  We do not condemn ants,  but  neither  do we respect them.54    In 
this respect,  the approach  of the  instructor in the case of the Mauritanian 
officers is more nearly correct — he was willing to engage with them to some 
extent,  even while maintaining  that  they were wrong. 
This certainly  does not mean that  SSR practitioners should preach their 
moral  views  at  any  opportunity. Treating   people’s moral  views seriously 
means treating  them  as views that  can be right or wrong, but  it also means 
taking  seriously how important they  are to people, and not  attacking  them 
in ways that  will seem overbearing,  insulting,  or hostile.  We can be moral 
realists while still agreeing that  sometimes the best thing to do is hold one’s 
tongue.  And even if I do not  embrace  the  “anthropological”  view sketched 
by some of my interview partners, it contains  important insights.  Most im- 
portantly,  what appears immoral to us may in fact be a reasonable  or moral 
response to  a  very  different  cultural  context,   and  there  may  be  multiple 
morally worthy ways of looking at the world. Apropos to the above discus- 
sion, it may also be an immoral but comprehensible response to a damaged 
social relationship.  SSR practitioners should be prepared  to engage with the 
moral  views of their  partners, even including  explaining  why  they  believe 
some of them  are wrong, while still keeping in mind that  they  should show 
respect  for the  fact that  others’ views, even when wrong, may express gen- 
uine insights, and deserve some respect and deference merely for being held 
sincerely.  In fact,  Kant —  no friend of moral relativism  — argued  that  a 
key duty of respect was trying  to understand why an incorrect  view seemed 
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reasonable to its holder.55 
Finally,  the  use of military  contractors for SSR and  training  programs 
should be carefully considered.  It may well be the case that  contractors can 
provide instruction  that  is  as good, or even better,  than  military  trainers.  
But  genuine  military-military contact  sends  a  different  message  than  the 
use of contractors. First,  the  use of contractors may  be seen (rightly  or 
wrongly) as a lack of “seriousness” on the part  of the SSR intervention that  
can  undermine  respect.  Second,  I have  argued  above that  SSR is about 
supporting  the  creation  of a social relationship  between  the  military  and 
the  civilian population.  Since military  contractors, whatever  their  personal 
skills, do not play the same social role as the active-duty  military, they model 
a different  kind of institution than  the military.   I will  not argue here that  it  
is better  or worse — just  different,  and  different  in a way that  should 
make us consider when the relationships  we are trying to support  would be 




Global Chains of Respect 
 
Though there  is a limited  amount that  individual  SSR practitioners or pro- 
grams can do about it directly, we should not forget the marco-scale aspects 
of respect.   On the smaller  macro-scale, US (e.g.)  security assistance  often 
comes with “strings  attached.”  US  military  capacity-building programs  in 
Africa often focus heavily on counterterrorism, which is one of AFRICOM’s 
stated  priorities.57  This focus on counterterrorism can  undercut  the  idea 
that  the US genuinely respects local priorities  when it gives assistance.  For 
instance,  when a military official characterized  US military humanitarian op- 
erations  in Tanzania  as a way of combatting the root causes of terrorism,  it 
actually  lessened the extent to which trust  was built with local populations,  
because terrorist  organizations  were not present in the area and were neither 
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an attraction nor a concern for most of the people there.58   An interviewee fa- 
miliar with the incident was less circumspect than the article — in his telling, 
the Tanzanians  had viewed the effort positively, because they saw it as com- 
ing from genuine concern for their well-being (they were not näıve enough to 
think  the US had no self-interested  motives, just that  the US was genuinely 
interested  in a prosperous and stable Tanzania,  even if for its own purposes). 
But after the official’s statement, they were disillusioned and angry at being 
used as instruments for a foreign policy goal that was not only tied up with 
US interests but irrelevant to their own lives — in my jargon, they felt dire- 
spected.59    Members of militaries who are exhorted  to take genuine notice of 
the needs of civilians and not use  them merely as tools for their  own ends 
may do as we do, not  as we say.  From  the practical  standpoint, we will be 
providing them  with tools appropriate for a  counterterrorist military  force 
— which may not be a social role they would play in a truly well-functioning 
local society.  Counterterrorists may not  be the  right partners  for a project 
that  could be shared  with local civilians.  However, when the  US is coming 
in with money, training,  and equipment, local militaries are much less likely 
to bite the hand  that  feeds them  than  to quietly plan  to  put  things  to use 
for their  own ends.  The mutual  direspect  and use of the other  as a  “mere 
means”  in such a relationship,  even if in some sense consensual or at  least 
expected, is toxic. 
On the broader macro-scale, SSR interventions  need to acknowledge that  
there  are global power relations  that  are often very damaging,  and of which 
SSR partners  are  certainly  aware.   The  US did  not  come out  of nowhere 
in the DRC. FARDC  members  know that  we were long-time supporters  of 
Mobutu,  and the US is widely perceived (with some good reason) as friends 
and  backers of Rwanda,  which was one of the  major instigators  of the  civil 
war in the DRC, and has been credibly accused of continued involvement in 
violence in the  eastern  part  of the  country.  Similar direct  histories  underly 
many  other  SSR projects,  such  as the  US in Liberia,  which was founded 
by Americo-Liberians  and  where the  US was seen as involved with Charles 
Taylor; the UK in Sierra Leone, its former colony; and the US and coalition 
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the need for SSR is most immediately 
the  result  of US-led invasions.  Beyond these direct  effects, SSR interveners 
are  often  powerful nations  that  wield immense  geopolitical  influence, and 
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who are  perceived  (rightly  or  wrongly,  but  not  without  reason)  as  using 
that  influence to perpetuate economic, political, and military  inequities that 
victimize recipients of SSR programs. 
Powerful nations can create dysfunctional  power relations without  malice 
or conspiracy.  The US is currently  the clearly dominant  military  power in 
the  world.  US military  power so far outstrips  any other  nation’s  (and  even 
most plausible combination  of nations’)  that  it can be persuasively argued 
that,  at least on a straightforward reading of the just war principles of “likely 
success” and  “proportionality,” conventional  military  resistance  to any  US 
operation would be immoral, because it would be futile.60  What kind of 
relationship  does that  set up with other  nations’  militaries?  To some extent,  
it puts  them  in the position  of the slave and the  US the  master  — even if 
the  US does not concern itself right now with  the  nation’s  goals, the  
military  cannot  hope to pursue  its nation’s foreign policy goals (even the 
“foreign policy goal” of national  defense) unless the  US acquiesces.  In this 
international context  of domination,  the practical  project of creating a 
military that  is beholden to a joint project with the local civilians is not 
available, since that  project would be constrained by the whims of the US, 
which is not a party  to it. 
It would be overblown for me to  draw  a direct  line from US military 
pre-eminence to, e.g., abuses in the DRC. The actual situation  is more com- 
plicated,  especially because,  as noted  above, domination  is never absolute 
in the  real world.  But  the  situation  is genuinely dangerous.  Militaries  who 
depend on outside  support  are less beholden to their  civilians.  If they  see 
themselves  less as partners  with  civilians in the  nation-state and  more as 
players in an international game dominated  by Western states,  this under- 
mines  the  basis of respect  — leaving only the  relatively  weak bulwark  of 
judicial accountability for human  rights  abuses,  at  best.  At the  same time, 
talk  of “local ownership”  and other attempts to build and model respect in 
the training itself will likely ring hollow, much as humanitarian assistance did 
to the Tanzanians  when they  realized it was about counterterrorism.  What 
does “local ownership”  mean if the locals’ foreign and economic policies are 
heavily dominated  by powers beyond their control?  We should not make the 
mistake of thinking that  locals do not think in broader terms, or understand 
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how the world works. 
SSR programs  and  practitioners have a limited  ability  to address  such 
large issues, but as a philosopher it is my luxury and obligation to bring them 
up.  True  reform would mean  addressing  the  imbalances  at  the  global scale 
by equalizing power more or giving  smaller countries  some say in the  eco- 
nomic and military  policies of the powerful — essentially creating  a respect- 
supporting joint social project on the global level. But,  failing the ability to 
do that,  respect from SSR practitioners should involve at  least acknowledg- 
ing and taking seriously these sorts of concerns. Even implausible conspiracy 
theories  about  AFRICOM’s  sinister  goals likely spring — to follow Kant’s 
duty  to seek the  truth in all views — from authentic  and not  unreasonable 
feelings of fear and  disrespect  in the  face of the  US’ overwhelming and  not 





SSR, even by practitioners who are sensitive to its moral aspects,  such as 
legitimacy and human rights, is often conceived of as a technical, institution- 
building project.  To some extent,  this  is necessary.  And to some extent,  it 
represents  a particular model of human  rights and  civil-military  relations. 
Especially in post-conflict  situations,  where security  has  broken down and 
security forces become abusive, it seems natural to conceive of the relation- 
ship between security forces and the population  as inherently  antagonistic.  If 
war has made the security forces into a Kantian  “race of devils,” then  the 
task  of an intervention is to forge new institutions that  can constrain them 
and give civilians back their  rightful supremacy. 
My argument,  in a nutshell,  is that  this antagonistic  image is problem- 
atic if we  want  to improve the moral character  of security forces.  Respect is 
fundamentally  about  building reciprocal relationships.   Institutions with 
symmetrical  abilities  to oversee and  punish  either  are at  best simulacra  of 
truly  reciprocal relationships. 
Of course, this sets a much more difficult project  for SSR than  teaching 
soldiers how  to shoot straight  and  what  the  laws of war are.   The  cynical 
response is that  no one should have expected  the reorganization  of violence 
in socieities damaged by war and misrule to be easy. The hopeful response is 
that,  at the very least, if my reflections on the role of respect here are correct, 
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